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2ABSTRACT
Assembly Square emerged out of the contraction of Somerville's
manufacturing base and the growth of the Northeast service economy.
Formerly called the Mystic River Area, the site once hosted both a Ford
Motor Company Assembly Plant and the food processing and warehousing
operations of First National Stores. Ford closed its Somerville operations
in 1958, and First National announced it would move in 1977.
Developers immediately began eyeing the River Area for commercial
use. The newly constructed Interstate 93 placed the site ten minutes from
Boston's Central Business District by automobile; and made it a potential
retail location easily accessible to suburban cities in the vicinity. By
1978, the Urban Development Action Grant program was available to fund the
local access and internal circulation improvements necessary to facilitate
commercial development.
Somerville officials wanted to balance commercial growth with
reindustrialization. However, traditional manufacturing was declining in
the region. Promotion of industrial development countered prevailing
economic trends, and reliable investors could not be secured.
The Assembly Square Mall and Office Park, named after the Ford
Plant, opened toward the end of 1980, aided by a package of public-private
development instruments. Benefits to Somerville, defined by employment;
property taxes; effects on city commerce and development, to date are fair
but not exceptional. Above all else, Assembly Square is important to
Somerville because it was the first modern development built in the city,
and is the potential foundation of a diversified local economy.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In November, 1982, planners who served three diverse Somerville
mayors praised the office and retail complex developed at Assembly Square as
an outstanding achievement for the city. Like many traditional
manufacturing cities in Massachusetts, the industries which underscore the
Somerville economy have been declining for a generation. Since 1969 a
public policy goal of the current and previous two mayors of Somerville--
S. Lester Ralph, Thomas August, and Eugene Brune--has been to foster
commercial development, and integrate the city into the new regional
economy. In this regard the Assembly Square Mall and Office Park, developed
between 1978 and 1981, is the showcase of Somerville, and represents six
years of work by city planners to promote the image of Somerville as a
forward-looking city. Assembly Square proved that Somerville can attract
major investors and build ambitious projects; it was a positive step towards
burying the lingering reputation of a seedy "Slumerville."
The efforts to make Somerville an attractive environment for
first-class investors and developers are being threatened by scandal too
reminiscent of the history of corruption in the city. From February, 1984,
Assembly Square has been the focus of a United States Grand Jury
investigation, including publicized subpoenas; and rumors of bribery,
extortion, and kickbacks. Officials of the current administration of Mayor
Eugene Brune fear that quality developers will shy away from doing business
6in the city, leaving Somerville to "bottom of the barrel" investors.1
To date neither officials nor activities of Brune's government have
been implicated by the probe. If corrupt institutions in the city are
uprooted by the investigation, Somerville may overcome this latest tarnish
to its image. Then, the development strategy which began with Assembly
Square can succeed or fail on the objective locational factors and
development opportunities found in Somerville.
Assembly Square as a Product of The National Economy
To understand why Assembly Square was developed it is necessary to
examine Somerville in the context of general industrial decline. The retail
and office development is a product of contemporary trends in the national
and regional economies, including the shifting relationship between central
cities and their suburban rings. The story of Assembly Square begins in the
mid-1920's, when the site was called the Mystic River Area of Somerville.
Ford Motor Company built an automobile assembly plant by the river, and
First National Stores established its corporate headquarters, food
processing operations, and warehousing center on a parcel adjacent to Ford.
Anchored by the Mystic River Area, Somerville became a major
industrial center in New England. The city retained its manufacturing base
into the 1950's. However, the national economy began to change in that
decade. Manufacturing employment has become a progressively smaller part of
the United States's economy and Northeast industries are an increasingly
smaller proportion of domestic manufacturing.
1Telephone interview with Thomas Pelham, Director of the Office of
Planning and Community Development, Somerville; March 9, 1984.
7In 1946 41% of private sector employment in the United States was in
manufactures, and an equal 41% was in service related industries. As a
share of the private economy, manufacturing employment fell to 38% in 1957;
29% in 1977, the year Assembly Square was proposed; and preliminary 1983
data pegs the manufacturing at 25%. During the same period service
employment has ballooned to 61% of the private sector through 1983.2 Of the
manufacturing sector retained in the United States, trends clearly show a
job flow from the Northeast to other regions of the nation. Bureau of Labor
Statistics employment data reveal that the Northeast region (defined as New
England and the Mid-Atlantic states) sustained a 10.8% decrease in
manufacturing jobs between 1950 and 1981. Further examination shows that
this sector was stable into the middle 1960's before the decline began. All
other broadly defined regions in the country--North Central, South, and
West--have increased manufacturing employment. As might be expected, the
overall growth in North Central states has been modest, 11.6% since 1950 and
7.4% from 1960-1981. However, since 1950 the West and South have more than
doubled their manufacturing sectors. 3
Aided by federal highway construction, dramatically increased
population mobility, and the advent of national capital markets, the
Southern and Western economies have matured. Investment has been attracted
2
2United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Employment and Earnings, February, 1984, p. 45.
3George Sternlieb, et al., Demographic Trends and Economic Reality:
Planning and Markets in the 80's, (Rutgers University, 1982), p..116; and
Bernard L. Weinstein and Robert E. Firestone, Regional Growth and Decline in
the United States: The Rise of the Sunbelt and the Decline of the
Northeast, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), pp. 16-18, 23-43.
8to these regions generally by lowers costs of land, energy, and (much less
unionized) labor at the expense of the developed Northeast. The growing
industrial base, in turn, has fueled additional infrastructure investment
and population migration from northern states.
Regional differences are equally clear when the rings of Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) are examined. By excluding central
cities, we are able to form a precise regional and national economic context
for urban suburbs such as Somerville. H. J. Brown, Ruby Phillips, and Avis
Vidal analyzed the economies of the 50 largest SMSA's in the United States
between 1967 and 1977.4 Their study is unique because they both stratified
SMSA's by central city and rings (also done in studies by John Kain and
Arthur Soloman), and they cross-stratified their analysis by regions.
Employment trends show significant gains in all parts of this country in the
ten-year period, 38% in the Northeast; 57% in the North Central; 97% in the
South; and 61% in the West. The study also shows a clear flow of jobs from
central cities to surrounding rings in all regions. However, the only
economic sector in any ring to show a net employment loss is manufacturing
in the Northeast. The rings of Northeast SMSAs sustained a net decline of
85,000 manufacturing jobs between 1967 and 1977, or 6%. In 1967 48% of
employment in Northeast SMSA rings was in manufacturing, ten years later the
proportion fell under 33%.
4H. J. Brown, Ruby Phillips, and Avis Vidal, Growth and
Restructuring of Metropolitan Economies: Decentralization and Industrial
Change During the 1970's, Unofficial Working Paper of the MIT-Ha'rvard Joint
Center for Urban Studies (Cambridge, MA: October, 1983).
9The study of Brown, et al., shows that growth in all sectors of the
private economy has been much larger in rings thanin central cities in the
Northeast. Services are being generated in the suburbs which traditionally
were provided in urban centers. For example, Finance, Insurance and Real
Estate (FIRE) services increased 153% in the rings, and declined 2% in
central cities. Similar patterns are found in the sectors of services,
retail trade, and wholesale trade. Two related reasons can be assigned to
these trends. First, as people have moved out of central cities, services
have located in the new population pockets. Second, the role urban rings as
the outlying manufacturing areas of central cities has been changing as
national and regional economies are restructuring. Ring areas are
diversifying their economies as a means of economic development.
The economic trends of the Northeast can be focussed onto the
metropolitan Boston region, comprised of five counties: Essex, Norfolk,
Plymouth, Suffolk (including Boston), and Middlesex (including Somerville).
This region is not the SMSA but, according to the Research Department of the
Boston Redevelopment Authority, is a fairer representation of the Greater
5
Boston labor market. Examining "low-tech" manufacturing in industries
traditional to the Boston area leads to the conclusion that the old
metropolitan manufacturing base is dying. During the 1969 to 1980 period,
food and kindred products lost 36% of its employment; apparel fell 28%; and
losses are observed of 24% in rubber and plastics, and 54% in leather. In
the overall metro economy, this trend has been counterbalanced by high
5Conversation with Jeffrey P. Brown, Research Department, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.
10
technology industries, including computers; optical instruments; and many
other technological goods.6
In sum, the metro economy expanded 22.5% between 1969 and 1980.
Economic growth was paced by services, particularly business and health
services, which grew by 64%, while employment in retail trade and FIRE each
increased 21%. As the economy has evolved, services and manufacturing have
been running on opposite tracks. In 1969, services accounted for 22% of the
Greater Boston economy and manufacturing for 34%. By 1980 the manufacturing
share--including high tech industries--fell to a 22% share and services
captured 31%.
The national and regional growth of service industries set off an
office and retail boom in downtown Boston. Between 1960 and 1983 $3.1
billion was spent on commercial construction in the Central Business
District, including 45 new office buildings, 14 new hotels, Faneuil
Hall/Quincy Market, and Copley Place. Furthermore, demand will exist for an
additional one million square feet of office space in Boston for the next
five years.8
The development of Assembly Square in Somerville is a product of the
above described trends. Named for the former Ford plant, it is an explicit
attempt to create an export commercial sector to replace the city's
6
Brown, Jeffrey P., Boston Business Trends: Suffolk County, the
Metro Area, and the United States, Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston,
MA, December, 1982; p. 51.
7Ibid.
8The Boston Conference: A City and Its Future; April 10, 1984.
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declining manufacturing base. The 210,000 square foot office building
competes with the nearby Central Business District (CBD) for firms which may
be enticed by lower rents. The retail mall is aimed at capturing trade
immediately north of the CBD from potential customers who are inconvenienced
by shopping downtown. In effect, Assembly Square is a trail blazer as
Somerville's first modern retail and office complex, and its most important
public-private venture to date. This report will examine the economic and
political changes in Somerville which created both the need and opportunity
to build this mixed-use complex. It also will explore the evolving nature
of economic development in the city, concentrating on planning for Assembly
Square. Finally, the economic impacts of the development will be surveyed
and evaluated.
CHAPTER II
THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF SOMERVILLE: 1947-1977
In the decade after World War Two, manufacturing was the backbone of
a strong Somerville economy. Manufactures comprised 38% of employment in
Somerville in 1947 and 35% in 1955.9 Manufactures are "primary" or "export"
industries which produce goods for markets beyond city boundaries or local
areas. These industries create an inflow of income, and stimulate demands
for goods and services among primary industries and their employees. This
demand, in turn, sparks economic activities within secondary and service
industries. In the first decade following the war, Somerville's key primary
manufacturing industries were Food and Kindred Products, and Transportation
Equipment. With the advantage of excellent railroad connections and
relatively low cost freight charges, fine roadway connections, and proximity
to Boston, secondary industries in the city included warehousing and
distribution, transportation, and wholesale trade.
In December, 1926 when Ford opened its automobile assembly plant,
the Mystic River was the major locational lure. The Company used water
transportation for incoming raw materials and outgoing shipments of
9 Community Renewal Program, Economic Analysis: Plan of Development,
Somerville, MA; The Planning Services Group, Inc.; Cambridge, MA; May 19,
1968, p. 16.
13
vehicles.10 Satisfied with its Somerville location, Ford invested $500,000
to expand its factory during the depression in 1937.11 In addition, the
rail and road connections at the Mystic River Area lured First National
Stores to the site. Between 1926 and 1930, First National invested roughly
$5,000,000 in the River Area.1 2
The changes in the Somerville economy are fully consistent with
post-war national and regional trends. Table 1 illustrates Somerville's
declining manufacturing base between 1947 and 1966, while Table 2 presents
an overview of the city economy from 1967 through 1982. It is easy to
observe the downward spiral of manufacturing in Somerville. In 1947
manufactures provided 39% of private sector employment in the city. By 1982
the manufacturing share was 21%, and it had dipped as low as 19% in 1976 and
1977.
The disinvestment in Somerville's industrial plant is seen more
sharply by studying the de-evolution of Food and Kindred Products and
Transport Equipment manufacturing in the city. In 1947 and 1955 they
accounted for 21% of Somerville's employment base and 55% and 59%
respectively of manufacturing jobs in the city. Food processing firms
employed 2753 people in 1947, and this level has declined steadily to under
1,000 by 1966.13 In the early 1950's, First National, the largest single
1 0Somerville Journal, February 27, 1958; p. 11.
1 1Ibid.
1 2Somerville Journal; April 18, 1930; p. 1.
1 3The Census of Manufactures, published by United States Census
(Footnote Continued)
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TABLE 1
Manufacturing and Key Industries as a Percentage
of Private Sector Employment in Somerville
Total Private
Employment
Manufacturing
Employment
% of Total
Food and Kindred
Products 2,753
% of Total
Transportation
Equipment
% of Total
1947
20,444
7,742
37.9
2,660
13.5
1,518
7.4
1955
21,861
7, 734
35.4
1,653
12.2
1,898
8.7
1963
17,688
4,763
26.9
973
9.3
148
0.8
1966 1947-1966
17,350
4,319
24.9
-64.7%
5.6
183
1.1
-11.2%
-44.2%
-87.9%
Source: Community Renewal Program, Economic Analysis: Plan of
Development, Somerville, MA; The Planning Services Group, Inc.
(Footnote Continued)
Bureau, lists 1,400 Food and Kindred Products employees in 1967; and 1,000
in 1972. By 1977, the sector had less than 450 employees in Somerville, and
therefore was not listed in the Census of that year.
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TABLE 2
Jobs in Somerville
Average Annual Employment
Contract
Construc-
tion
1119
1131
1141
1155
1188
1226
1158
1150
1131
1287
1368
1376
844
917
812
795
Mfg.
4381
4330
4621
4304
3954
3692
3654
3524
3395
3112
3017
3099
3235
3483
3351
3301
6
7
6
6
7
7
7
6
7
8
9
9
6
6
5
5
Trans.
Comm.
25
2525
24
22
20
21
20
21
19
19
20
22
22
22
21
Source: Massachusetts Department of Employment Security
Year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Total
Employ-
ment
17458
17237
18184
17801
17651
18447
17399
17814
16332
16280
15968
15513
14963
15647
15368
15950
Util.
1686
1692
1565
1500
1356
1476
1863
1738
1474
1399
992
943
1110
1223
1018
1043
Retail
Trade
7189
6843
7290
7638
7958
8007
6702
7100
6080
6230
6290
5779
5351
5147
5160
5512
%o
10
9
8
8
8
11
10
9
9
6
6
7
8
7
7
FIRE
508
390
339
342
317
323
447
691
464
497
518
441
517
524
551
524
41
40
40
43
45
43
39
40
37
38
39
37
36
33
34
35
Ser-
vices
2535
2814
3189
2832
2853
3694
3550
3585
3770
3726
3755
3861
3894
4334
4461
4758
3
22
2
2
2
3
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
3
15
16
18
16
16
20
20
20
23
23
24
25
26
28
29
30
17
employer and taxpayer in Somerville, was the industry's leader in the city.
Other major firms included the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company; John
P. Squires Company; North Packing and Provision; and New England Dresses,
Meat, and Wall Company.14 By the mid-1950's, Swift and Co. acquired and
operated the production facilities of the latter three meatpacking firms. 15
In the mid-1970s, first Swift, then First National closed their Somerville
operations. When First National left Mystic River in 1977, it symbolized
the end of Somerville as a major food processing center.
Ford, the second largest employer and taxpaying establishment in
Somerville during the mid-1950's, in effect was the Transport Equipment
sector of the Somerville economy. Direct employment at the assembly plant
ranged from 1400 to 2600 depending on the cyclical health of the automobile
industry. In addition, the ripple effects of auto manufacturing on the
metro economy were significant. In the years following the war, Ford
purchased $2,500,000 of local goods and services annually.16 The assembly
plant closed down and was sold in 1958. Between 1955 and 1963 Transport
Equipment Manufacturing in Somerville fell from 1898 employees to 148, and
ceased to be a major factor in the city. (Table I)
Somerville's image as "blue collar town" grew out of both its
industrial base and the manufacturing employment of its residential
14
1 4Cheney, Isobel, Brief History of Somerville: 1630-1956, Book Two,
Publication Date Unknown, p. 89.
1 5Real Estate Tax Commitment Books, City of Somerville, 1957.
1 6Somerville Journal, October 23, 1980, p. 10.
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workforce. Approximately half of the jobs available in Somerville are taken
by residents, but that covers only one quarter of working Somervillians. In
fact, more residents work in Boston than in their home city.17 Jobs within
Somerville that are especially desirable, such as automobile assembly line
worker, may spark competition which crowds out residents. The Somerville
Journal estimated that less than 20% of Ford's employees were from
Somerville.18 However, as wages are lower in other types of manufacturing,
secondary services, and other sectors, potential workers are less inclined
to travel for them, and therefore residents hold a higher ratio of these
jobs.
Table 3 describes the employment composition of Somervillians. In
1950, nearly half of employed city residents were "blue-collar" workers.
Over the following 20 years, to 1970, the goods producing sector of the
residential workforce fell to 38%; by 1980 it was 28.5%. During this
30-year period the percentage of employed residents who worked as
professionals or clericals rose rapidly. Due to changes in census data
formatting in 1980, exact comparisons of service type jobs among
Somervillians are not possible. However, it seems clear from available data
17
1 7United States Census: Characteristics of the Population, 1960;
Journey to Work, 1970; General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1980.
Data are based on samples.
1 8Somerville Journal, February 20, 1958. The 20% was constant. A
Ford Company public relations magazine, Ford Somerville News, September,
1948, reported approximately 300 or 1500 employees lived in Somerville.
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TABLE 3
Occupat
Total Employed
Residents
Prof., Technical,
Kindred
Managers,2
Officials,
Proprietors
Clerical and
Kindred
Sales
Service Workers
Operatives,
Craftspeople,
Laborers
Others
ions of Employed Somerville Residents: 1950-1980
1950 % 1960 % 1970
40,848 100.0% 39,275 100.0% 37,381
3,015
2,545
8,399
2,927
4,216
19,512
234
7.3
6.2
20.6
7.2
10.3
47.8
.6
3,211
1,839
8,734
2,271
4,057
16,948
2,295
8.2 4,377
4.7 1,617
22.2
5.8
10.3
43.2
5.8
9,837
2,116
5,221
14,213
1980
Total Employed
Residents 37,797 100.
Managerial 2
& Professional 8,128 21.5
Technical, Sales
& Administrative
Support 13,375 35.4
Service 5,513 14.6
Operatives,
Craftspeople,
Laborers 10,781 28.5
1 Includes members of Armed Forces
2 Includes Agricultural
0%
100.0%
11.7
4.3
26.3
5.7
14.0
38.0
%
20
that city residents are becoming more oriented towards office work, and that
this trend has accelerated since 1970.
Regarding employment of Somerville residents within specific
industrial classifications, examining the number of Somervillians working
within Food and Kindred Products over time is particularly interesting. In
1950 and 1960, when food processing was the largest manufacturing sector in
the city, 2657 and 2628 residents respectively worked in the industry. By
1970, as the sector began its decline, 1132 residents were employed; and in
1980 the number was 720. Note that this trend is correlated closely with
the life and decline of Food and Kindred Products firms in Somerville. This
suggests strongly that Somervillians filled many of the food processing jobs
in the city. By 1980 more residents worked in the industry than the number
of such jobs in the city.1 9
The parallel trends of the employed residential labor force and the
city's job market are related as are the explanations of these economic
changes. Clearly, composition of the workforce is shaped in part by
obtainable jobs. Secondly, the proportion of service related jobs has
increased while the city's population has fallen from 102,351 in 1950 to
77,372 in 1980.20 Less services are needed for Somervillians, suggesting
that Somerville is becoming an attractive address for people who work
outside of the city. At the same time, selected service industries in
1 9United States Census: Characteristics of the Population, 1950;
1960; 1970; General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1980. Data are
based on samples.
2 0Ibid.
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Somerville are being used for economic export to clients beyond city lines.
Perhaps most importantly, the increases of service- related employment in
Somerville and among its residents are occurring as women become a growing
proportion of the city's workforce (33.7% in 1950, 37.9% in 1960, 41.6% in
1970, and 48.1% in 1980). Nationally and locally women make up a
disproportionate share of -"white collar" labor. In 1980 86% of employed
Somerville women worked in service, clerical, or professional jobs.2 1
As Somerville has deindustrialized, the city has become poorer
relative to the Boston SMSA. Median incomes and minimum income levels were
examined from 1950 to 1980 in Table 4. In 1950 Somerville's median income
was 109% of the SMSA; as the city's economy has shifted, Somerville's income
has fallen dramatically to 77% of the SMSA median by 1980. Similarly,
selected family income and poverty statistics reveal that Somerville had a
smaller percentage of lower income families than the SMSA in 1950. By 1960
it had a slightly higher rate of minimal income families, and the gap has
become wider in 1970 and 1980.
Employment levels within cities, distinct from residents'
occupations, measure the vitality of industry and commerce within city
limits. In turn, the health of these sectors determine the strength of
municipal tax bases where citizens' incomes generally are in low to moderate
strata. Usually residential property value, and hence residential tax
bases, reflect income levels. When a municipal tax base is supported by
2 1Ibid.
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TABLE 4
Median Household Income and Percent Below Selected Minimum
Family Income Levels: Somerville and Boston
SMSA, 1950-1980
A. Median Income
Somerville
$ 3,168
6,024
9,594
14,401
Boston SMSA
Somerville
as a percen-
tage of
Boston SMSA
$ 2,909
6,622
11,449
18,694
109%
91
84
77
B. Minimum Family Income Level
Somerville
119502
19603
19703
1980
24.7%
11.9
7.5
9.6
Boston SMSA
30.4%
11.3
6.1
7.5
1
2 Less than $2000 per year
Less than $3000 per yearFederal Poverty Level
Note: The minimum levels of 1950 and 1960 are not comparable with each
other or with the 1970 and 1980 poverty level. Percentages should
be used to compare Somerville with Boston SMSA within single years
only.
Source: United States Census: Characteristics of the Population, 1950;
1960; 1970; Social and Economic Characteristics, 1980.
1950
1960
1970
1980
23
export industries, a city effectively has people from outside its borders
supporting its public services.
The number of households in Somerville has increased since 1950 from
27,955 to 29,687 in 1980.22 Despite the broader residential base,
Somerville's property tax assessments have declined between the 1950's and
the present. In 1958 the year the Ford plant closed down, real estate in
Somerville was assessed at $126,166,400;23 in Fiscal Year 1983-84, assessed
value is at $115,780,838.24 Unfortunately, real property assessments by
classification are not available prior to 1967. As expected, from 1967 to
1981 the burden of carrying the tax base has progressively shifted to
residential property. In 1967, homes and apartment buildings were valued at
63.5% of the Somerville tax base, but by 1981 residential property carried
72%.25
2 2Ibid.
2 3Annual Report; City of Somerville; 1958.
2 4Tax Recapitulation of Somerville; Fiscal 1984.
2 5 The Planning Service Group, Inc., p. 96; Property Classification
Report, Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Bureau of Local Assessment.
Somerville's property tax valuations by the Board of Assessors are
notoriously ad-hoc. Gerald McCue, Treasurer of Somerville, said that the
city does not have a logical tax assessment formula that can be traced over
past years. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has set Somerville's
equalized valuation at $330,000,000. However, a market analysis conducted
by OPCD places Somerville's 100% property valuation at about $1,100,000,000.
CHAPTER III
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MYSTIC RIVER AREA
The transformation of Somerville's Mystic River Area into Assembly
Square is pivotal in the overall changes of the city economy. First the
river, then a railyard, thirdly the intersection of Routes 1 and 28, and
finally an adjacent interstate highway, historically has made the site an
enticing location for manufacturing and warehousing firms. With the
establishment of Ford and First National, the River Area became a major
industrial pocket in Somerville and the metropolitan region. By the late
1950s, the assembly plant supplied automobiles to 323 New England Ford
dealers, and employed well over 1,000 hourly and salaried people.26 First
National, at its operating peak, had nearly 2,000 employees. The
supermarket's Somerville complex was a distribution center for 214 stores in
its "Somerville Division," and processed foods for 572 stores in New England
and New York.2 7
On the afternoon of February 19, 1958, the Ford Motor Company
announced its plans to close the Somerville assembly facility by the coming
March 14th, and sell the shell of the plant and its 32 acre site within
2 6 o2 6Somerville Journal, February 27, 1958; p. 11.
27Somerville Journal, May 29., 1959; p. 1.
25
thirty days after the shutdown.28 The closing was part of the ten-year
consolidation program which was to include laying off 40,000 employees. 29
The Mystic River plant had three drawbacks in Ford's national perspective.
First, it was tooled to produce the discontinued Edsel line. Second, a
company spokesperson argued that the high cost of machinery required at
least a two shift operation for economic efficiency. However, two shifts
were not possible in Somerville because the plant did not have room to
expand for required storage space.30 Finally, the original locational
factor that attracted Ford to Somerville was the River; but by 1958 cars
were no longer being transported by water.31
The Ford closing had been rumored for many years before the fact. 3 2
When it was announced, judging from the written record, the news was
digested calmly. Perhaps it was because less than 20% of Ford employees
were Somervillians, some 300 out of 40,000 employed city residents. In
addition, food processing, not automobile manufacturing, was the city's
major industry. The city government and Chamber of Commerce appeared
concerned over the adverse impact the closing would have on the municipal
tax base. Ford was Somerville's third, sometimes second, largest tax payer
accounting for about 2% of the city's assessed real estate and revenues (see
2 8Somer( ille Journal, February 20, 1958; p. 1.
29Somerville Journal, March 6, 1958; p. 10.
3 0Somerville Journal, February 20, 1958, p. 1.
3 1Somerville Journal, February 27, 1958, p. 1.
3 2 Ibid.
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Table 5). In context of the tax base, Mayor William J. Donovan referred to
the closing as a "near-tragedy."3 3
To maintain the tax base, and secondarily to preserve jobs in the
city, official Somerville quickly mobilized to find a buyer for the Ford
facility. Before the era of Community Development Departments, City Hall
did not have an in-house organ to market the property and city to
prospective investors. The Chamber of Commerce assumed the initiative, and
took charge of finding a purchaser through its Industrial Development
Committee (IDC). The Mayor formally confirmed the Chamber's role, and
directed Somerville's Urban Renewal Authority to assist the Committee.34
The Ford disinvestment operation was efficient. By April 2, only
100 salaried and 125 hourly paid workers remained on the payroll. At that
date, Ford publicly set the sale price of the property at $1,750,000,35 some
$700,000 below its tax assessed valuation (Table 5).
The IDC reported receiving several inquiries regarding the Ford
plant. Ironically, one such feeler came on behalf of Volkswagen. However,
33
Mayor William J. Donovan's Midterm Address, January 5, 1959. The
Boston and Main Railroad, which then owned 29 parcels of land in Somerville,
including five in the Mystic River Area, was Somerville's largest taxpayer.
For one example, in FY 1977 its property value was assessed in excess of
$5,000,000. Also, Swift and Co. paid roughly the same amount of taxes as
Ford in 1955, 1957 and 1958. In 1959 its property was valued at $2,455,612;
however by 1967 the valuation of Swift and Co.'s property fell to $953,200.
3 4Somerville Journal, February 27, 1958; p. 2.
3 5Somerville Journal, April 3, 1958; p. 1.
TABLE 5
Tax Payments and Impact on Somerville Tax Base by Ford Motor
Company and First National Stores in Selected Years
Ford First National
Tax Rate
per $1000
of Assessed
Value
$ 63.20
71.20
79.20
83.40
96.20
126.80
181.80
237.60
Valuation
of Real
Property
(000's)
$2,091
2,433
2,433
Gross
R.E. Taxes
Before
Abatements
(000's)
$132
173
193
% of
Somerville
Tax Base
1.7%
1.9
1.9
Valuation
of Real
Property
(000's)
$3,727
4,227
4,227
5,766
5,558
5,526
3,525
3,336
Gross
R.E. Taxes
Before
Abatements
(000's)
$236
301
335
481
535
701
641
792
Note: First National received a tax
year was $469,000 (rounded).
abatement of $231,740 in 1967. Net taxes paid that
Sources: Annual Report, City of Somerville; Real Estate Tax Commitment Books, City of
Somerville
Year
1955
1957
1958
1959
1962
1967
1972
FY1977
% of
Somer-
ville
Tax
Base
3.0%
3.4
3.4
4.7
4.4
3.5
1.6
2.7
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the German car manufacturer lost interest when it found that the site did
not have a tidewater dock. 3 6
In the last week of May, First National Stores, with the IDC acting
as an intermediary, purchased the former assembly plant. First National
thus coupled Ford's 32 acres with its adjacent 20 acre site, and took
possession of the plant in September. First National remained "bullish" on
the Mystic River Area due to easy access to railroad facilities, low freight
charges, good roadway connections for the time, and ambitious highway
construction proposals including an urban innerbelt slated for Somerville. 3 7
Mayor Brennan hailed First National's acquisition of the Ford plant. He
stated that the new use of the site "heralds a reinforcement of the
prosperity of this city based on the stability inherent in the food industry
which is so predominant locally." 38
Somerville's economy sustained a substantial job loss due to the
Ford-First National change. First National used the former assembly plant
as a shipping-receiving center, and to augment its warehouse space. 39The
labor required for these functions is a fraction of a one shift automobile
factory. Furthermore, Somerville lost about $900,000 in its tax base as a
result of the changed land use. In 1958, Ford was assessed at a value of
36
Somerville Journal, February 27, 1958; p. 1.
3Somerville Journal, May 29, 1958; p. 1.
38Donovan, January 5, 1959.
3 9 Sachs, Celine, Assembly Square Mall and the Role of Planners as
Catalysts in the Renaissance of Somerville; Unpublished Paper, May 19, 1982,
p. 4; Assembly Square'Mobile Workshop, Background Papers for American
Planners Association Conference, April 27, 1981.
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$2,433,397 for its two Mystic River parcels. One year later, the same
parcels, then owned by First National, were valued at $1,538,537--a drop of
36.8%. Applying the 1959 tax rate of $83.40 per assessed $1,000 reveals
that Somerville lost $74,631 in tax revenue in 1959 due to Ford's
disinvestment.40
In the 1960's First National began to contract. In 1963 the
corporation employed 1186 at its Somerville center, less than one-half of
41the combined Ford-First National employment level of the 1950's. By 1976,
First National had 800 employees at Mystic River. Moreover, the 1970's
was a period of "shakeout" in the supermarket industry. By 1976, First
National was reduced to 260 retail outlets in New England, New York, and New
Jersey.43 Also, at the same time, the WT Grant department store chain went
out of business, and was selling its warehouse in Windsor Locks,
Connecticut.4 4
In August, 1976 First National management (the corporation had been
renamed Finast) sent a letter to Teamsters Local 829 informing the union
that the company was "considering the feasibility of relocating certain
operations now being handled at our Somerville warehouse." However, public
relations director, Robert Nolan, denied that First National was leaving
4 0Real Estate Tax Commitment Books, City of Somerville, 1958; 1959.
4 1The Planning Services Group, Inc., p. 30.
4 2Somerville Journal, August 22, 1976; p. 1.
43Interview of John Matthews by Celine Sachs and Joseph Soley, March
31, 1982.
4 4Somerville Journal, September 23, 1976; p. 6.
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Somerville, saying, "As far as I'm concerned, it's just a rumor. We're not
moving."45 One month later, the Griffin Report of New England, a grocery
trade journal, reported: "After many months of planning and study, Finast is
in the final stages of deciding where it will go when the warehouse in
Somerville, MA is closed. [Finast is] currently bidding for the W. T. Grant
warehouse . . ." The article also reported that McCarthy Transport, a
contract carrier for First National, was planning to close its business.
Instead of responding to the intensified rumors of disinvestment, First
National management refused to comment.46
During the last week of September, 1976, First National confirmed
that it would move to Connecticut by mid-1977. The move made sense from a
corporate perspective. Connecticut was the center of the consolidated First
National chain, and locating in Southern Connecticut considerably reduced
transportation costs. In addition, the W. T. Grant building was a modern
one-level warehouse, and it was judged too expensive to attempt to modernize
the split-level buildings in Somerville. 4 7
The announcement by First National was a blow to Somerville's job
and tax bases and its status as a manufacturing center. First National was
the largest manufacturing firm in Somerville--Swift and Company, the city's
second largest manufacturing firm since Ford departed, had closed its
45
Somerville Journal, August 12, 1976; p. 1.
4 6Somerville Journal, September 23, 1976; p. 6.
4 7Somerville Journal, September 30, 1976; p. 1.
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Somerville operation two years earlier.48 Compounding the city's problems,
also in September, 1976, the MBTA purchased some of the property owned by
Boston and Maine Railroads in Somerville, and leased it back to the B&M,
allowing the Railroad to avoid part of its property taxes.49 The city's tax
base appeared to be crumbling. Moreover, coming on the heels of Swift's
closure, First National's move marked the end of Somerville as a major
meatpacking city.
The Somerville government tried to have First National reconsider
its decision. The Ralph administration explored lowering the company's
property tax bill as an inducement to stay. However, at a meeting with
Mayor Ralph, First National executives stated clearly that the supermarket
chain was not leaving because of Somerville's high tax rate. The move was
influenced by the changes of the corporation.50
As with Ford's disinvestment, First National left Somerville due to
its corporate considerations. In both cases, the city was a bystander as
trends in the national economy and the availability of larger tracts of land
elsewhere resulted in substantial city and regional job losses. When Ford
closed its plant, the city's economy was firmly based in food processing
industries. Somerville did not have a similarly strong industrial sector to
shore up its economy in the mid-1970's. Somerville's valued real property
tax base peaked at nearly $128,000,000 in 1965. On July 1, 1977, the base
4 8  e4 8Somerville Journal, July 29, 1976; p. 1.
49Somerville Journal, September 23, 1976; p. 1.
50
Ferguson, Laura; Notes on Interviews in Somerville, MA; July 26,
1978; p. 6.
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was valued at under $121,0000000, and Somerville faced the loss of its
largest firm. 5 1
5 1 Annual Report, City of Somerville, 1965; 1977.
CHAPTER IV
ROOTS OF OFFICE AND RETAIL DEVELOPMENT
The Assembly Square Mall and Office Park, opened four years after
First National closed its headquarters, but it can be traced to the 1960's.
As was observed earlier, trends indicate that the economies of Northeast
urban rings were shifting away from a manufacturing concentration and
towards "white-collar" sectors. Extending Interstate 93 north of Boston
opened up Somerville's Mystic River Area for commercial development as an
export factor in the Somerville economy.
The politics behind urban highway building are complex, justifiably
emotional, and beyond the scope of this report. In simple terms, proponents
of development often tout highways as needed infrastructure for long-term
local and regional economic growth, and short-term public works jobs.
Opposition is varied. The core usually are residents and businesspeople who
are threatened with displacement or a lower quality of life by the proposed
construction. Opposition is also created because seizure of urban land for
public roads removes valuable acres from a city's tax base. Moreover
residential neighborhoods sliced into wedges next to large highways often
become undesirable, property values fall, and more tax revenue is lost.
Somerville's economic development planning in the mid-1960's
centered on proposals to build 1-93, and 1-695, an innerbelt highway which
in Somerville would have connected 1-93 with Routes 1 and 28. The proposed
construction would have created a trapezoid shaped circumferential roadway
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network around East Somerville and the Mystic River area. Within the
trapezoid, the Somerville Redevelopment Authority envisioned an "Inner Belt
Industrial Center" (IBIC). Though Somerville historically has been among
the most densely populated cities in the United States, and East Somerville
is the most densely settled area in the city, the proposed highway and
development program would have forceably changed the neighborhood into a
commercial/industrial zone.52
The administration of Mayor Lawrence F. Bretta avidly supported the
highway program as an economic development strategy for Somerville. City
Hall published pamphlets, newspaper supplements, and "Developing the Inner
Belt Urban Renewal Area: A Guide for Prospective Developers." Use of
phrases regarding Somerville such as "forward looking city," and "modern
development" were used for the first time in the post-war era as the Bretta
government tried to lure investors into Somerville's "planned industrial
environment."53
The fight in Somerville during the 1960's over the extension of 1-93
has had profound implications. The struggle in opposition marked the
beginnings of organized reform and progressive politics in the city.
Community mobilization against construction begat: the coalition that soon
afterwards instituted rent control; the political career of Sal Albano,
considered the most progressive of the city's Board of Aldermen who now
5 2Boston Sunday Globe, October 17, 1965; Twelve-page color pullout
section published by City of Somerville.
5 3Ibid. Also untitled, undated pamphlet published by the Somerville
Redevelopment Authority.
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chairs the Board's Housing and Community Development Committee; and the
foundation of Lester Ralph's first mayoral campaign in 1969.54 1-93 was
extended through Somerville, but sustained opposition in the city and
Cambridge prevented the construction of the proposed Inner Belt.
A detailed cost benefit analysis of 1-93 also lies beyond the scope
of this study. However, it is important to note the major impacts brought
by the highway. Land taken for 1-93 removed over $2,000,000 in assessed
value from the Somerville tax rolls; loss of this taxable land has cost
Somerville $250,000 to $600,000 per year in revenues depending on the tax
rate per thousand dollar valuation (see appendix for annual tax rates).55
While the gross economic impact of forced removals and relocations of homes
and businesses is measurable, the social costs on East Somerville--both on
evictees and the residents who remained--are incalculable. Yet 1-93 has
created a commercial/industrial park corridor in the metro-Boston area which
now is being mined. John Matthews, currently the Director of Community
Development in Medford, and formerly the project manager for the Assembly
Square development in Somerville's OPCD, believes that 1-93 has created
excellent office, retail and industrial park locations in the north
metro-region. Matthews specifically cited Assembly Square and a multi-use
development planned in Medford. He observed: "The office market is being
5 4Interview with James Kaplan, December 26, 1982.
5 5 Inaugural address of Mayor James F. Brennan; January, 1968.
Brennan put the amount of assessed property taken at $2,059,000.
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established late on 93 because it was the last interstate built. It was
only five or six years ago that 1-93 was looked at as an asset."5 6
As a bittersweet footnote, the construction of 1-93 isolated an
enclave of eleven homes and eight "mom and pop" businesses near the Mystic
River Area. Years later when the city proposed to develop Assembly Square,
its plan required building local roadway infrastructure in place of this
handful of buildings. The proposal cited the blighted living conditions and
stagnant small businesses of the dying neighborhood isolated by 1-93 as a
justification for the use of eminent domain.57
In 1969, Lester Ralph was elected Mayor of Somerville as part of a
city-wide reform movement. Ralph served four tumultuous terms as Mayor,
from January, 1970 to January, 1978. His mandate was to promote human
services, education, and housing policies on behalf of the city's low to
moderate income residents. Under his administration, human services in
Somerville expanded widely; a Community School System was established, and
long delayed capital improvements were made. Also during the Ralph years,
Somerville's funded debt grew from $5,510,000 in 1969 to $29,500,000 in
Fiscal Year 1977-78; and the City's tax rate rose from $143.80 in 1969 to
$268.10 in FY 1977-78 ($268.10 in 1977 equaled $162.19 in 1969 dollars).
5 6Interview with John Matthews, March 28, 1984.
5 7Urban Development Action Grant Proposal, City of Somerville to
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development; October 31, 1978;
p. 25.
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During this period Somerville's assessed tax base fell from $124,000,000 to
$121,000,000.58
During the tenure of the Ralph administration, and in the succeeding
years, Ralph has been criticized for ignoring the need to expand
Somerville's tax base. Matthews voiced the common criticism of Ralph.
After praising the Mayor's accomplishments in human service fields, he said:
Ralph's policies were all short-term oriented. They concentrated on
social programs, schools, and public investments . . . and didn't try to
attract development dollars to change the [city's] economig base.
Somerville was losing industry, but nobody was coming in.
Though Ralph was not successful in attracting major private
investment, he was concerned about new development in Somerville. In his
first inaugural speech, he said:
I am conferring almost daily with businesspeople from within and without
he city to encourage them to come into Somerville and build high rise
office [buildings]. I shall be touring the city by helicopter with the
presidents of two of Boston's largest developing firms in the hgges that
they might invest some of their huge capital funds in the city.
Federal policies of the time encouraged planning, but gave scant
support to implementation. However, with the availability of federal
dollars, Ralph presided over Somerville's first modern development
department. At a forum on planning in Somerville held November 19, 1982 at
the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, Carla Johnston--the first
Director of the Office of Planning and Community Development (OPCD)--
recalled only one planner worked for the city when Ralph came into office.
5 8Annual Report, City of Somerville, 1969; FY 1978.
59Sachs and Soley, March 31, 1982.
6 0 Inaugural address of Mayor Lester Ralph, January 5, 1970.
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This planner advocated far sweeping urban renewal in East Somerville as part
of the innerbelt strategy; other forms of economic development were not
being considered.
The planners in Ralph's Community Development Department did not
have the necessary tools to develop modern office and retail centers in
Somerville. First, the office market was bubbling in the CBD of Boston, but
had not yet spilled northward; 1-93 was an unknown asset. Secondly, the
investment climate in the city was not good. The reform administration was
alienated sharply from the "old-guard" that controlled non-mayoral
institutions in Somerville. Moreover highly publicized scandals rocked the
city during Ralph's later years as Mayor. During the early-to-middle 1970's
the idea of public-private development partnership was a new concept. The
volatility within Somerville's "establishment", and the poor public image
reinforced by scandal, were not conducive to attracting major private
investors who would have to work with the city government. With regard to
the Assembly Square development, First National Stores, then Somerville's
largest employer and second largest taxpayer, occupied the site where the
mall and office park now stand until the final months of Ralph's mayoralty.
CHAPTER V
COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR THE MYSTIC RIVER AREA
Soon after First National's plans to disinvest from Somerville were
confirmed, commercial developers began eyeing the Mystic River Area. The
site's proximity to Boston's Commercial Business District, and a heavily
populated potential consumer market north of the central city, made it a
viable office and retail location. Though First National would not be
completely out of Somerville until mid-1978, rumors regarding the sale of
its 52 acres began circulating in May, 1977. On May 19th the Somerville
Journal reported that the site might be sold to a developer for a "housing,
commercial, and industrial complex." 6 1
A week later, the Journal described a pair of meetings which
appeared to confirm the rumors of new development. The first meeting was
held on May 17th at the offices of Glaser-de Castro-Vitols, architects for
the real estate developing firm of Stackhouse Associates. Representing
Somerville were Frank Sestito, then Director of OPCD under Ralph, and Mary
Tomeo who chaired the City's Board of Assessors. Tentatively, Stackhouse
representatives discussed building a shopping mall, two 26-story apartment
buildings to house 496 low and moderate income families, and possible
industrial development. Participants at the meeting explored available city
61Somerville Journal, May 19, 1977, p. 1.
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incentives, including street and parking area construction, and a temporary
tax abatement agreement. The second reported planning meeting took place
the next day between unnamed "city officials" and John Marino, Commissioner
of Massachusetts Commerce and Development. According to Sestito, the
purpose of this conference was to discuss how the Commonwealth could help
support the development. Overall, the projected private investment of the
Stackhouse proposal roughly was $46,000,000; $6,000,000 for the First
National property and $40,000,000 in development costs. 6 2
The significance of these meetings is two-fold. First, they show
the time was right for commercial development in the Mystic River area. The
growth of suburban retail markets, the construction of 1-93, economic trends
away from manufacturing and towards a service economy, and the availability
of a pre-assembled 52-acre site presented a development opportunity to the
private sector. In addition, because of the previous industrial uses, the
existing sewer, water, and power lines on the site were more than adequate
for commercial needs. The Ralph administration and other Somerville
institutions wanted the city's economy tied to growth sectors. On May 26th,
the Journal hoped that the impending loss of First National could be turned
63into "a shot in the arm for Somerville." Second, the meetings also
outline the negative externalities of Mystic River for commercial
development. Namely, the local roadway network and internal circulation
system was inadequate for retail use. Though located off 1-93 with
6 2Somerville Journal, May 26, 1977, p. 1.
6 3Ibid.
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excellent visibility, access was difficult, and onsite transportation was
oriented for railroad cars and trucking. Moreover, building a roadway
access system required use of eminent domain powers. The meeting with
Marino clearly indicated that the expensive roadway improvements were beyond
the city's means, and outside assistance was needed as a linchpin for the
development project.
In July,-1977, the Stackhouse proposal appeared on its way to
realization. A joint press conference was held by Ralph; Governor Michael
Dukakis; Dennis Stackhouse; Victor Vitolis; and Alan Harberman, the
President of Finast. Finast agreed to sell its land to Stackhouse
Associates within 90 days for $6,000,000. Stackhouse and Vitolis formally
revealed a $40,000,000 development plan which included high rise housing,
and office and industrial space. The former Ford plant was to be renovated
into a 426,000 square foot enclosed shopping mall. 6 4
The Stackhouse plan collapsed in three months, and the 90-day option
was not exercised.65 Although Stackhouse conducted a market study which
indicated the site was profitable, he could not secure financing for the
project. The proposal called for a 150,000 square foot Ann and Hope anchor
store. According to Matthews, the anchor was too large for the planned mall
6 4Somerville Journal, July 21, 1977, p. 1.
6 5Somerville Journal, July 27, 1978, p. 1; also Somerville Journal
February 23, 1984, p. 1.
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space (which may have been reduced later to 350,000 square feet.) 6 6
Literature on mall development refers to anchors as loss leaders subsidized
by developers to attract retail volume to malls. Regional shopping centers,
such as this proposed project, often have at least two anchors. Developers
profit by charging high rents to the small tenants which locate in the mall
67
to benefit from the customer flow lured by anchors. The Ann and Hope
store was too large for a relatively small regional mall. It was feared
that sufficient rentable space would not be available to make the mall
profitable, particularly with a second anchor also consuming a large chunk
of space. Moreover, Ann and Hope is considered an upscale department store.
Investors may have doubted if an upscale anchor in Somerville could attract
volume necessary to sustain a mall, or if smaller outlets which cater to
upscale clientele would rent space in Somerville; they often demand a quota
of signed leases as proof of a shopping center's viability. The mall with a
pre-selected anchor appears to have been the best developed idea of the
Stackhouse package. When the retail concept proved unable to jell, the
entire proposal fell apart.
The development failure presented City Hall and First National with
problems. In FY 1978 (July 1, 1977 to June 30, 1978), First National's
property was assessed at a value of $3,332,500 and its gross tax bill
6 6Sachs and Soley, March 31, 1982.
6 7See Urban Land Institute, Shopping Center Development Handbook,
Washington, D.C., 1977.
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amounted to $893,443, 2.8% of Somerville's tax base.68 It was also
Somerville's largest employer with about 800 jobs well-matched to the city's
69
resident workforce. After Stackhouse, it appeared that the city would be
unable to replace those jobs. The job loss combined with the publicity of
disinvestment emphasized the image of Somerville as a dying city. From the
corporation's perspective, First National was about to be saddled with an
unwanted facility, and be responsible for tax payments. It seems unlikely
the First National would have defaulted on property it priced for sale at
$6,000,000. As time passed the assessed value of the property would
decrease, but so would a commandable sales price. Thus, both the city
government--Thomas August became mayor in January of 1978--and First
National wanted to promote re-use of the Mystic River site.
In 1978, events crystalized which allowed First National's property
to be redeveloped into office and retail space. The Federal government
provided the means for infrastructure development through the new Urban
Development Action Grant (UDAG) program. UDAG criteria perfectly matched
the economic conditions of Somerville, and the program goal of leveraging
maximum private with public monies was suited to commercial development
projects. In addition, infrastructure development was specifically
6 8Real Estate Tax Commitment Books, City of Somerville, Fiscal Year
1978.
6 9 Somerville Journal, August 12, 1976, p. 1.
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mentioned as a valid use of the program. Enacted in 1977, the program began
operations in 1978.70
Also in 1978, August assumed the Mayor's office. The new
administration hired John Matthews as Federal Funds Coordinator in OPCD.
His job was to aggressively seek federal dollars for which Somerville
qualified. Matthews had just completed a Masters of Business Administration
program at Carnegie-Mellon University where he analyzed the new UDAG program
in depth.7 1
The final and most important piece of the redevelopment puzzle was
that the site remained attractive to commercial developers if the roadway
problem could be solved. In June, 1978, representatives of the East Bay
Development Corporation came to Somerville City Hall with the idea of
creating "the Assembly Square Mall," a retail design based around the theme
of the Ford plant in the 1920s.
Founded in.1973, East Bay had become a major retail development firm
in its five-year corporate existence. At the time that East Bay expressed
interest in the Mystic River area, it had developed or was developing malls
in six states, including four in Massachusetts: Billerica, North Weymouth,
Woburn, and Chelsea. East Bay built what it termed "community sized
regional malls" tied together with cohesive advertising packages, and
explicitly spurned "large, sprawling malls." In addition, East Bay and the
7 0 United States Housing and Community Development Act of 1977.
7 1 Sachs and Soley, March 31, 1982.
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K-Mart chain had a working agreement that the department store would locate
anywhere East Bay selected through market analysis. K-Mart has a moderate
income clientele. The dense populations of Somerville, Everett, Medford,
and Charlestown, all within a few minutes drive of the proposed mall, made
the site appear as an excellent location for K-Mart, far better than for Ann
and Hope.7 2
The East Bay concept differed from the Stackhouse proposal in
important factors other than the key anchor store. First, East Bay
originally had a limited objective to build a shopping mall. It became
interested in larger scale development when its New York office, later
organized as the Assembly Square Trust, reasoned that the whole 52-acre
First National site would have to be developed if a retail mall was to be
attractively situated.73 Second, its line of financing was secure.74
Third, in 1978 Somerville had more tools available to help with access
problems of the site. Aside from the untested UDAG program, the federal
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program changed its funding formula
72UDAG Proposal, October 31, 1978; also Sachs and Soley, March 31,
1982.
7 3 Peattie, Lisa, Rein, Martin; Interview with John Matthews,
February 19, 1982.
74
Telephone interview with John Matthews, April 26, 1984. OPCD did
not have a back-up plan for roadway development if the UDAG was not
approved. The total of the city's 1978 CDBG equaled the final UDAG. Yet
during August's two years as mayor, Somerville received $18,000,000 in
federal aid, both for specific projects and discretionary use in the city
within given guidelines. It is possible that alternatives to the UDAG could
have paid for adequate roadway infrastructure.
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coincidental with the August mayorality. Somerville's CDBG allocation
increased ten-fold from $330,000 to $3,300,000 in August's first year.
Finally, the K-Mart was slated at 90,000 square feet out of a 360,000 square
foot mall. This left room for a second anchor plus profitable "filler"
stores. A factor which remained constant in the two proposals was the need
for the public sector to assume the costs of roadway development. East Bay
representatives were clear; if Somerville wanted commercial development, it
would have to provide access and circulation systems. 7 5
After a month of negotiations with City Hall, it was announced
publicly that East Bay would develop the First National property. At the
press conference with East Bay executives, Mayor August said:
This development is a golden opportunity for this city. It will provide
jobs and strengthen our tax base, but it will be up to us to provide
this necessary cooperation to make this a reality . . . Thi 5 is a team
effort; without everyone's cooperation, it will not happen.
Matthews and other OPCD staff began developing a UDAG proposal to
fund infrastructure improvements. At the same time, East Bay negotiated
with First National for purchase of the property. During these initial
dealings, First National was sold to Pick and Pay, a midwestern based
supermarket chain. Pick and Pay executives ordered their First National
7 5Somerville Journal, July 27, 1978, p. 1.
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subsidiary to leave Somerville immediately (First National was conducting a
slowly phased withdrawal from its Mystic River plant, and providing job
placement assistance to workers facing layoff.) As a result, First National
rushed to complete negotiations for the sale. The cost to East Bay was
$4,000,000 in November, 1978, $2,000,000 less than the negotiated price to
Stackhouse.76 One month earlier, in October, the UDAG proposal to fund
infrastructure improvements of Mystic River and create Assembly Square was
sent to HUD.
City officials initially defined their choices for the First
National land as: (1) develop with East Bay proposal; or (2) do nothing.
When asked if alternatives to the Assembly Square development were
considered, Matthews replied that there were not any discussed. He further
stated that without roadway development, which occurred due to the Assembly
Square project, the site would have deteriorated into warehousing space,
renting at $2-$5 per square foot, offering little employment, and with a low
tax return.7 7
The East Bay proposal was the core of the UDAG application. It was
a firm commitment to develop a retail mall and office building on the First
National site if the public sector would provide the requisite roadway
improvements. Leveraging public funds to secure private investment exactly
fit the program objective. However, the application sent to the Department
7 6 Sachs and Soley, March 31, 1982.
7 7 Telephone interview with John Matthews, March 9, 1984.
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of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) went far beyond supporting the East
Bay initiative. The city tried to use the UDAG to shape development, and
the grant proposal reflects the strategizing in City Hall for the future of
Somerville. The city, using East Bay as a jumping off point, requested over
$9,500,000 from HUD for an industrial park at the Brick Bottom area of the
city as well as a greatly expanded Assembly Square project. The application
reflected both hopes of revitalizing Somerville's manufacturing sector and
extending downtown Boston north along 1-93.
Brick Bottom Development Area
The Brick Bottom proposal was for the creation of an industrial park
on a former manufacturing site between East and Central Somerville. Though
not funded by HUD, it is important to examine this part of the application
because it represents a conscious effort by the August administration to
revitalize Somerville's industrial base. Using the UDAG, City Hall wanted
to rebuild the traditional Somerville that clearly was dying. The city
planned to use the UDAG to acquire and clear several blighted parcels with
five partially occupied or vacant industrial buildings, and develop a modern
roadway network. Then, properties would be resold further using UDAG funds
to subsidize cost writedowns. In the application, the city argued: "This
method is the only way to create new industrial growth in a city with a
density of 21,060 per square mile." As projected, an approximate $3,600,000
UDAG for Brick Bottom would generate at least $20,000,000 in new industrial
investment in Somerville. The goal was to create a 32-acre light industrial
park through the Somerville Redevelopment Authority, to be administered by a
not yet created Somerville Development and Industrial Corporation; build
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five to seven modern buildings; and recap an increase of $800,000 in annual
property taxes. Note, the Brick Bottom proposal did not contain job
creation estimates. The development idea was too vague for a projection.
Matthews recalls that responsible staff in the Somerville government
knew that the Brick Bottom plan would not be funded. However, August wanted
it submitted.78 Irene Jenkins, HUD's regional office field representative
for Somerville, called the plan "speculative," and said that UDAGs are not
invested on speculation. Indeed, the application includes five letters of
very qualified support from interested developers and tenants, but lacked
firm commitments to invest in Brick Bottom.79
August carries a simplistic label as "the conservative" mayor of the
old Somerville (i.e. the pre-Ralph machine). His administration hired an
outside consultant, Robert Vey, to formulate a plan to rebuild Somerville as
a manufactures based city. However, this proposal went against the
prevailing economic trends, requiring forceful market intervention as
investors could not be quickly recruited and committed to the project.
The Assembly Square Development Area (ASDA)
The proposal for the ASDA was very different than Brick Bottom.
Prevailing economies created the concept, pushing mall developers towards
City Hall with offers of private sector investment. However, the requested
UDAG went far beyond a retail mall and office building and included a hotel,
7 8Matthews, March 9, 1984; and March 28, 1984.
7 9Telephone interview with Irene Jenkins, February 24, 1984.
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additional commercial space, a recreational area, and a small light
industrial park. The master plan embraced 144 acres bordered by the Mystic
River on the northeast; the Somerville-Charlestown line on the south; and
1-93, Middlesex Fells Parkway and Mystic Avenue to the west. In 18 months
it would be designated as an urban renewal area when the Board of Aldermen
formally passed a Chapter 121B resolution.
The City of Somerville's development plan called for a mixture of
adaptive reuse and new construction. East Bay was proposing to renovate the
former Ford assembly plant into a one-level 350,000 square foot shopping
mall; build a 130,000 square foot office and retail structure by re-adapting
parts of the former First National office and plant building; and develop a
waterfront restaurant in an old art deco powerhouse on the site. The city
also requested funds to encourage further development: a 60,000 square foot
office/light industrial building; a 200 room hotel-convention center; and 14
acres of additional commercial development by the District Courthouse.
Finally, in the same spirit as the Brick Bottom proposal to revive
Somerville's manufacturing, the city proposed to transform the Tenny
Court-North Union Street area in an "incubator industrial park" for small
business under the administration of OPCD. The city needed to acquire the
11 homes and eight micro-businesses (containing 25 jobs) in the area,
isolated from the remainder of Somerville by 1-93, to build roadways linking
Assembly Square'to Broadway--a major cross-city avenue which lies in part on
the other side of the interstate.
The August administration also wanted to encourage the Metropolitan
District Commission (MDC) to develop the Somerville bank of the Mystic
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River, owned by the MDC, as a recreational park area. The city planned to
explore the possibility of waterfront luxury housing and a marina. Finally,
if sufficient transit demand existed at the ASDA, the possibility was
mentioned that the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority could be
induced to build an Assembly Square station on the rapid transit Orange
Line. The line's surface tracks pass through the site. Constructing a
station would be reasonable in cost, and link the ASDA to Boston's CBD by 15
minutes on public transportation.
OPCD requested a $5,933,000 UDAG for Assembly Square. Major uses
were to be for: land acquisition at Tenny Court-North Union Street, the
Courthouse area, and around Middlesex Falls; a relocation budget; demolition
and clearance; roadway construction/improvements; and administration and
contingency. Private investment for land purchases and construction was
projected at about $38,000,000. Funds received from developers for land
parcels other than the First National site would be used to seed the
incubator industrial park.
The August administration changed the straightforward East Bay
development concept into a plan more complex than the failed Stackhouse
proposal. The city had three basic goals for the ASDA. First, it wanted to
promote major real estate investment into Somerville and strengthen the tax
base. Second, as presented, ASDA development would provide jobs for
Somerville residents at all income levels and skills. The incubator park
would have been a job well for Somervillians who have had manufacturing work
all their lives. The plan projected over 1,000 construction and 1,765
permanent retail, office, and industrial jobs in the ASDA. Of the permanent
jobs, roughly 1,100 (62%) were anticipated for low and moderate income
52
people; 500 (28%) to middle income, and 176 (10%) to upper income. Implicit
in this breakdown is that levels of marketable employment are equivalent to
income stratification.
The third goal of the ASDA plan was to create a downtown focus in
Somerville. The city is decentralized economically and socially. Local
shopping revolves around small businesses and a handful of mid-sized
department stores in neighborhood squares, and a lot of shopping for major
items is done outside the city. This export of capital effectively means
that Somervillians are supporting the economies and tax bases of other
municipalities at the expense of their own city. Through the development of
Assembly Square, the city hoped to retain capital; attract retail patronage
and office space rentals from other cities, and manufacture commodities to
export. A downtown Somerville would create a natural district for further
office/retail expansion, and possibly bring an influx of upper income
professionals to tax lucrative waterfront housing in future years.
HUD staff carved the grant request to the minimum East Bay proposal,
the mall in the Ford plant which carried firm private sector investment
commitments. However, development of the primary office building was funded
implicitly. The improvements required to facilitate access to and around
the retail mall also provided a roadway system for the adjacent parcel.
Table six summarizes the final UDAG allocation, actual expenditure, and
private investment in the site.
The Assembly Square project carried high expectations even as a two
building development. Final engineering studies for East Bay indicated that
the renovation of the First National building could be expanded to 200,000+
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square feet of gross office space.80 Eventually 925 office and 735 retail
81jobs were expected on the site as permanent employment. In the fall of
1979, in the midst of a bitter campaign for reelection, August said:
East Bay is the largest employer and taxpayer in Somerville, even though
they're still in the demolition stage. The city of Somerville has
continued to have hig unemployment, and we certainly need the jobs this
project will create.
Today, the mall and office park are the only developed portions of
the ASDA. The mall's two anchors, K-Mart and Jordan Marsh, sit on the ends
of a rectangular one-lane "shopping street." Of its 323,400 square feet of
gross leasable area (gla), K-Mart occupies 94,000 and Jordan's has 73,000.
As of March 15, 1984, 59 establishments rented spaces in the mall: the two
department stores; eighteen clothiers; nine shoe stores; nine small/fast-food
eateries plus one full-service restaurant; three jewelers; two card shops;
and fifteen miscellaneous chains. Six spaces, five being very small, are
vacant.
The Assembly Square Office Park is in two parts. The major piece, a
four-story, V-shaped office building contains 210,000 gross square feet and
187,341 gla. The building opened in December, 1980, and now has eight
tenants and a vacancy rate of. about 20%.83 A ninth firm, Urban Research
8 0Matthews, March 9, 1984.
8 1UDAG Proposal, October 31, 1978.
8 2Cambridge and Somerville Post, September 26, 1979. According to
UDAG evaluation report submitted by Somerville to HUD on September 30, 1982,
the project generated 400 construction jobs.
8 3Spaulding and Sly Market Report, Fourth Quarter, 1983, lists a 19%
vacancy rate. Robert Pihlcrantz, former leasing agent for the office
building with Merrideth and Grew puts vacancies at about 30% (letter to
Steven Landau, March 29, 1984).
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TABLE 6
Public and Private Expenditures in Assembling Square: 1979-1983
A. UDAG
Purpose
Road Construction and improve-
ments in Assembly Square land area
Land acquisition in Tenny Court-North
Union Street, and Exxon Station in
Middlexes Fells area
Demolition, clearance, relocation
Administration and contingencies
Totals:
Authorized
Costs (1000s)
1,287
1,225
500
288
3,300
Actual
Expenditures
as of May 31,
1983 (1000s)
2,104
1,002
25
131
3,262
Sources: Financial Statements, UDAG Funds, City of Somerville, Grant number
B-79-AA-25-0014; Zafarana, Macdonald, and Suny, CPAs; November 18,
1983.
B. Private Investment
Purpose
Land acquisition
Contract with Cleveland Wrecking Co.
Renovation of Assembly Plant
and anchors' investment
Renovation of office building
Construction of Sack Theaters
- Total:
Amount
(lQOOs)
4,000
800
18,000
12,000
1,615
36,415
Sources: Soley, Joseph, Interview with John Matthews, January 14, 1982;
Public Information Summaries of MIFA Revenue Bond applications;
Jordan Marsh Company; Saxon Theater Corporation.
Note: Figures do not reflect investments made by smaller mall stores.
Therefore, the private-public leverage of $11-$1 presented above is
conservative.
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Associates, is a one person company loosely affiliated with a large tenant,
Bernett Research. A Sack Corporation theater complex adjoins the office
building. Opened as six theaters in mid-1981, the successful complex now
houses twelve. Sack originally planned to re-adapt a First National garage
building. Subsequent engineering studies revealed that the garage would be
inadequate for the layout of sufficient seating. Therefore, Sack
constructed a building, the only new structure now in Assembly Square.8 4
Public Incentives
A package of public-private development instruments was pieced
together for the Assembly Square project. Interestingly, land writedown was
not provided. First National, in its haste to leave Somerville, sold its
land and buildings to East Bay for $4,000,000. An additional $1,000,000 was
needed for partial demolition and clearance. The $5,000,000 land cost was
supportable by the project. The public package was a piecemeal collection
of available programs used for infrastructure, attracting desired tenants,
and providing a bearable tax rate during the start-up period of the
development. Cash outlays and loan subsidies were spread among state and
federal taxpayers. The tax agreement, involving the possibility of foregone
city revenues, was supported by Somerville. The components of the package
include:
1. The UDAG
This grant is described above. The federal $3,300,000 were used by
Somerville to develop a roadway system around and within the site,
8 4 Matthews, April 26, 1984.
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compensate property owners, and provide relocation assistance to twelve
households and three businesses.
2. Designation of Assembly Square as a
Commercial Area Revitalization
District (CARD)
CARD designation makes commercial projects within the district
eligible for tax-free industrial revenue bond financing through the
Massachusetts Industrial Finance Agency (MIFA). Matthews remarked that CARD
designation was "another tool we had available to use . . . if you're
writing an urban renewal plan, it only takes a couple of paragraphs to
designate it as a CARD district." 8 5
A CARD is first designated by a city's governing body (for
Somerville, voted by the Board of Aldermen), and then approved by the
Commonwealth's Secretary of Communities and Development. Loans are made
directly between the applicant and a commercial bank, and then approved by
appropriate city and state agencies. The bank is issued MIFA bonds to fund
the loan on which interest income is tax free. Terms, including interest
rates, and the name of the lender are confidential, and thus are not part of
the public record. The CARD designation was an important incentive for
attracting Sack Theaters and Jordan Marsh. Sack borrowed $1,600,000 of its
$1,615,420 capital costs at the tax free rate. Jordan's received $4,000,000
to cover its projected costs for locating in Assembly Square.86 According
to the Somerville Journal, interest MIFA backed loans ranged between 8.5%
8 5 Matthews, March 28, 1984.
8 6 Public information summaries of MIFA Revenue Bond applications:
Jordan Marsh Company; Saxon Theater Corporation of Boston.
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and 9.5% in the summer of 1980 when the two corporations applied. Mark Leff
of MIFA said that interest on the tax free loans are 75% to 80% of market
rates on a floating interest basis.8 7
East Bay desperately wanted to bring Jordan Marsh into the mall to
lure upscale consumers and mall stores to Assembly Square. The estimated
market pull the mall would have with Jordan's was estimated at 450,000
shoppers within ten minutes and 750,000 within twenty.88 To lure Jordan's,
the developer was forced to compliment the tax-free financing. First, East
By agreed to hire Wilder-Manley as the leasing agency for the mall. Second,
it purchased the Dowling Building in Malden, Jordan's previous
north-of-Boston store which had closed. Jordan's came to Somerville, and at
least ten firms subsequently located in the mall explicitly because of the
department store.89
3. Small Business Administration (SBA) Loan
SBA provides subsidized loans and loan guarantees for qualified
businesses. Aside from the two department store anchors, Dapper Dan's, a
full service 205 seat restaurant, is the largest establishment in the mall.
"Dan's" is locally owned, and planners at OPCD helped assemble an SBA
application. The restaurant has been successful, and recently opened a
second eatery in Stoneham.
8 7Somerville Journal, July 17, 1980; Interview with Mark Leff, March
20, 1984.
8 8Sachs, May 19, 1982.
(Footnote Continued)
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4. Tax Agreement Between the City of Somerville
and East Bay
East Bay began negotiating for a state chapter 121A classification
in November, 1979. The designation would have allowed a tax formula for
Assembly Square to be set directly with Somerville's Board of Assessors in
lieu of payments based on assessed property value. After months of
wrangling the application tentatively was denied by both the Assessors and
the Massachusetts Department of Revenue.90 In August, 1980, Assessors voted
to set tax estimate guidelines for the developer, and East Bay withdrew its
request for a 121A when its attorney, John Lynch, "received assurance of
reasonable and competitive tax levies through the negotiation process."
Such an agreement is not absolutely binding, but provided some certainty of
future tax levels.9 1
The formal agreement is in a letter from the Assessors' office to
East Bay dated August 19th. A tax schedule was set at $1.25 per square
foot, based on mid-1981 occupancy expectations. For FY 1981 and FY 1982,
the tax rate would be levied only on income-producing space in the mall and
office park. Undeveloped parcels were to be taxed at regular vacant land
rates. Through this agreement, property taxes would not be an undue
financial drain on the developer. The Assembly Square tax rate was in line
with malls in Burlington and Chelsea. The Burlington rates per square foot
(Footnote Continued)
8 9 Sachs and Soley, May 4, 1982.
9 0Somerville Journal, February 23, 1984, p. 1.
9 1Somerville Journal, August 14, 1980, p. 1.
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was $1.05 for retail and $1.31 for office, while Chelsea's retail mall was
taxed at $1.23.92
Problems of Further Development
Despite available public assistance, high interest rates during the
construction and start-up periods caused a serious cash drain. The prime
interest rate stood at 9.06% in November 1978, when East Bay bought the site
from First National. As it completed demolition in September, 1979 the
prime had risen to 12.90%, and during 1980 and 1981 the average monthly
rates fluctuated between 15.25% and 20.50%.93 Chains were very cautious
about opening new branches and assuming new debt at the prevailing rates.
This resulted in a piecemeal start-up which diluted the publicity impact of
"grand opening," and also hurt East Bay's cash flow. Finally acceding to
Jordan's demand to buy the Malden building compounded the financial strain
of the new development.9 4
The high interest rates, the fact that Somerville remains unproven
as a commercial location, and the city image are contributory reasons why
other parts of the master plan, particularly the hotel, have not been
developed. The ASDA plan was to be implemented in phases. First, the mall,
office building, and detached restaurant were to be built. The second phase
was to be the hotel in the early 1980s. To date two serious development
efforts have been made for the vacant hotel site. A small hotel chain
9 2Sachs, Celine, Soley, Joseph; Interview with Jack O'Neill.
9 3Federal Reserve Bulletin, Table 1.33: Prime Rate Charged By
Banks. Rates given are monthly averages.
9 4Sachs and Soley, May 4, 1982.
60
assembled 50% of the necessary financing before the effort fell apart.
Secondly, Howard Johnson's was looking for a main headquarters, narrowed its
choice to Somerville or Brockton, and picked the latter. Phases three and
four, more office/retail space and waterfront development are forgotten for
practical discussion.95 With two isolated buildings and 2400 free open air
parking spaces, Assembly Square is a suburban development in an urban
setting as was proposed by East Bay. The ASDA has not given Somerville the
downtown focus desired by City Hall in 1978.
9 5 Interview with E. Thomas Pelham, April 14, 1984.
CHAPTER VI
ASSEMBLY SQUARE IN SOMERVILLE
The tangible impact of Assembly Square for Somerville can be
measured by job generation and real property taxes. The ripples in the city
caused by the project are difficult to analyze. These include the mall's
effect on established retail trade in Somerville; Assembly Square's utility
as a base for further development; and how the complex contributes to the
definition of Somerville.
Employment
When First National left Somerville, the move cost 800 jobs,
approximately 5% of employment in the city during 1977. These were
important jobs, largely taken by residents. The mall and office park now
house nearly 1600 permanent jobs, perhaps 10% of employment in the city;
better than 1400 are new jobs for Somerville. These jobs overwhelmingly are
clerical, sales, and restaurant/fast-food workers. As of July 22, 1983, 789
persons had permanent full or part-time jobs at the mall. An additional 116
were estimated as seasonal hires, probably for the Christmas season. Of the
regular jobs, 22 were mall staff and 767 were employed by 54 estab-
96
lishments. 96Since that survey was compiled, the mall has grown to 59
9 6 Jane Skuncik, the mall manager, furnished a list of tenants
regular employees, and seasonal employees, dated July 22, 1983.
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establishments, and likely contains over 800 permanent employees. Based on
the 1983 statistics, Jordan Marsh, K-Mart, and Dapper Dan's combine to
employ over 300 permanent staff, roughly 38% of the mall's workforce. The
eight fast-food and sandwich restaurants employ 124, 43 of them in
McDonald's; 336 jobs are available in the 43 other establishments.
Weeks before any part of the -mall opened, more than 1000 people, at
least 90% from Somerville, applied for jobs.97 In late 1980, the state's
Department of Employment Security reported that 78% of mall employees were
from Somerville. As the initial hiring cycle faded, so did the emphasis on
local employment. By April, 1982, OPCD staff estimated that Somerville
residents held between 37%-50% of the jobs in the mall. 9 8
Evaluating the nature of mall employment is difficult. The changing
proportions of city hires indicate that a substantial number of jobs are
volatile. Undoubtedly many pay close to the minimum wage. Fast food and
retail chains target young workers for part-time employment; many require
little experience, do not invest in human capital development, and accept
employment turnover as a natural factor of business. However, national and
regional chains also provide career ladder opportunities. For example, in
October, 1980, as hiring was starting for the new mall, the Endicott Johnson
show store and Papa Gino's advertised for "management trainees." Johnson
sought three trainees and five part-time sales people for Assembly Square.9 9
9 7Somerville Journal, October 2, 1980, p. 3.
9 8Sachs, May 19, 1982.
9 9Somerville Journal, October 2, 1980, Classified Advertisement
Section.
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Of the 59 establishments in the mall, over 50 are parts of chains which may
offer "trainee"/management opportunities in Somerville or elsewhere to
Somervillians. Some of the mall establishments, particularly the anchors
and Dapper Dan's, employ full-time and part-time workers at a variety of
levels. Finally, it must be noted that part-time and temporary work fit the
objectives of some people, and therefore should not be considered "prima
facie" evidence of "bad jobs" or underemployment.
Eight firms plus Sack Theaters rent space in the Office Park. The
theater complex employs over 60. Of these 6 are unionized projectionists, 3
are managerial, while the remaining personnel are teenagers or young adults
working part-time. Over 700 people work in the office building. Table 7
illustrates the composition of office jobs. Note, unlike the mall where
almost all establishment were new to the city, the office building has just
two start-up firms. However, five of the six firms which relocated to
Somerville reported that as clerical positions became vacant, they were
filled by city residents. Thus, while not creating new jobs, attrition has
created employment opportunities for Somervillians. Most clerical work is
localized; generally people do not travel far to secure these jobs. Two
firms reported that several professional employees moved to Somerville after
the company located in Assembly Square. Overall, about 24% of the office
building workforce are from Somerville; of the total clerical and other
non-professional slotted employees, 38% are residents. Office wages range
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from a low of $4-$5 per hour to salaries comparable to unionized food
processing or warehouse workers and higher for professional staff.1 0 0
More jobs exist in Assembly Square than the First National
operations. The jobs available to Somerville residents differ widely in
wages and working conditions (as did the varied jobs in the First National
plant). Employment in Assembly Square probably is more desirable than most
of the First National jobs to a large majority of people who work in the
mall or office building. The question is raised: for whom should
Somerville's development policies target jobs?
Assembly Square provides employment for the growing proportion of
the Somerville labor force that is "white collar." Many Somervillians have
held manufacturing jobs for their working lives and cannot adapt easily to
the service economy. An affirmative desire to maintain their employment
base led to the blown-up $9,500,000 UDAG submitted to HUD by the August
administration. Assembly Square--its development and the employment it
generated for the city--is a conservative product of national and regional
economic market trends over the preceding 30 years. The employment market
at Mystic River-- Assembly Square is both a victim and beneficiary of the
shifting economies.
Taxes
During its final year of operations, First National in Somerville
was valued at $3,332,500 and assessed for $893,433 in taxes, 2.8% of
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See Boston Area Wage Survey published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, for detailed salary information for clerical and production
employment classifications. Mean warehouse worker wage is listed at
$8.32/hour in August, 1983.
TABLE 7
Office Firms in Assembly Square
Name of Firm
Number of
Employees
Full- Part-
Time Time
Prof .
Cleric./Other New Jobs
Somervillians
Employed:
Prof. / Cleric.
(or other)
SBC Management
Bernett Research
Assocates
Urban Research
Associates
Sprint
Ogden Security
SCA Services, Inc.
GCA Vacume Ind.
Computer Learning
Center
System Development
Corporation
,20
150
20 4
20 130
1 1
85
21
125
60
85
21
20
16 -
- 1301 2
1
- 56
- 14
125 42
58 2 47
30 20 4050
200 200 - 40
29
7
- 65 due to
phone industry
expansion
-2
83
13
10
160
- 50--new
establishment
- 200--new
establishment
17 Back Bay,
Boston
35 Burlington
- Burlington
29 Financial
District,
Boston
5 Financial
.District,
Boston
30 Fenway,
Boston
6 Union Sq.;
Somerville
2
2
5
40
Totals 712 560 152 264 318 130 315 6
1. Phone and personal interviewers. Employment varies widely depending on contracts held by firm.
2. Does not include 350 security guards who work out of the Somerville office. Fifteen guard jobs
classified as new--security at Assembly Square.
Source: Telephone Survey of office building establishments; March, 1984.
Prev.
Location
167
can be
-
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Somerville's real property base. Holding First National's valuation
constant and applying the FY 1984 tax rate of $211.95 per $1,000, the tax
assessment would have been $706,323. The Assembly Square parcels are valued
on the City Assessor's books at $1,408,800, and is taxed for $298,595 in FY
1984, 1.2% of the city's base. 10 1
Apparently, the 1980 tax agreement was never implemented. By the
letter, the mall was listed at 331,000 gla and the office park at 206,200
gla. The two parcels tentatively were scheduled to return $325,000 in FY
1981 and $450,000 in FY 1982 based on projected occupancy. In FY 1983, the
final year of the agreement, full occupancy was expected which would have
yielded $671,000. Also in that year, the development was to be reassessed.
OPCD staff estimated the post-agreement tax return to be between $650,000
and $750,000 annually.1 0 2
In practice, taxes on the development are paid through the standard
system of valuation and assessment, and the "value" of the development is
woefully low compared to its $40,000 cost. In FY 1981, all five parcels,
two with the mall and office park and three vacant lots, were valued at
$1,204,360. During the last three fiscal years the value has been
$l,408,800.103
101Real'Estate Tax Commitment Books, Fiscal Year 1984. According to
Gerald McCue, Somerville's Treasurer, tax revenues received from the mall
are based entirely on the valuation by the Board of Assessors.
1 0 2 Sachs and Soley, April 14, 1984. The different gla from previous
citations may reflect the theaters and two offices in the interior of the
mall.
1 0 3 Real Estate Commitment Books, Fiscal Years 1981-1984.
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The valuation has reaped disappointing tax returns for Somerville.
In FY 1981, owing to an abnormally high $292.11 tax rate, revenues received
were equivalent to the earlier projections. Adding in the vacant parcels at
the regular tax rate, Assembly Square should have returned $355,000 and
actually paid $352,000. However, FY 1982 was the first year Proposition 2
was implemented, and the tax rate dropped to $246.82. For FYs 1982 and
1983, the rate has stood at $211.95. -The tax levy for FY 1982 was $347,720,
and--as mentioned above--$298,595 during the following two years.104 By
examining possible returns under the agreement, the scope of lost revenues
can be seen. FY 1984 is a good year for an example because ranges of
vacancy rates are available.105 Accepting high estimates of 30% office and
10% mall vacancies, at a return of $1.25 per square foot, equals $180,250
and $372,375 respectively. The actual returns paid on the mall and office
park were $166,847 and $110,829, a total shortfall of $274,949.
On April 2, 1984, Somerville's Board of Assessors voted to hire
Phillip Waterman, a professional real estate appraiser, to reasess the
property value of Assembly Square. Assessor John Howe, sponsor of the
motion to hire Waterman, said: "I think this will help the tax base quite a
bit."106 The future base tax for Assembly Square, if valued in a
straightforward means, and not with income triggers, may indeed rise
dramatically. For example, assuming a $40,000,000 true value at 2 % equals
104 Ibid; also Sachs and Soley, April 14, 1984.
1 0 5Technically the agreement expired after FY 1983. The operating
assumption is that it was extended pending revaluation.
1 0 6 Somerville Journal, April 5, 1984.
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$1,000,000 in property tax revenues. Or, OPCD estimates that Somerville
property is assessed at a city-wide average of 10.45% of market value; 1 0 7
$40,000,000 multiplied by .1045 equals an approximate value of $4,182,000.
At the current $211.95 tax rate, the development may generate $886,000.
Commerce in Somerville
Frank Stellato, President of Somerville's Chamber of Commerce,
believes that the Assembly Square Mall's effect on the city's established
retail trade has been minimal--"One or two merchants complain," he said,
"but solid businesses are doing well." 1 0 8
Residential shopping is organized around a half dozen local square
which provide products and services appropriate for neighborhood markets.
Many types of businesses in the squares do not overlap with the mall,
including: supermarkets, convenience stores, ethnic groceries and
restaurants, full service hardware stores, and local services. As an
indication of Somerville's changing population, the squares are starting to
sprout establishments like croissant bakeries and gourmet pizza restaurants
which also do not face competition from the mall. Many fast food/quick
service restaurants are located in the squares. Though these types of firms
are in the mall, eateries in the squares cater almost exclusively to
neighborhoods' residents and local labor markets while similar
establishments in the mall draw business from retail shoppers and workers in
the complex. Dipper Dan's is the only bar in the mall, and is the sole
107Somerville's 1982 100% Property Valuation; Unpublished Memorandum
in OPCD; May 25, 1982.
1 08Telephone interview with Frank Stellato, March 13, 1984.
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restaurant which regularly attracts diners. Dan's clientele largely reflect
well-to-do office workers in the city and the multi-city market of the mall.
Most of Somerville's neighborhood bars and restaurants, with noticeable
exceptions, are aimed towards moderate income/working class customers.
The mall may be having an adverse impact on local shoe and clothing
stores. However, as Stellato remarked, small businesses are notoriously
volatile, and closings cannot be easily traced to the mall. Regional
department store chains in the squares, Almy's in Davis Square and Bradley's
off Union Square, have remained in business despite the mall. Both of these
stores are in direct competition with K-Mart for moderate income consumers.
Moreover, a neighborhood retail center, including a Service Merchandise
appliance store; shoe stores; and clothiers, opened near Union Square two
years after Assembly Square began business.
Summary: Impact of Assembly Square in Somerville
Findings regarding the short-term impact of Assembly Square are
mixed. It has generated employment at varied levels for Somervillians;
twice as many jobs now are on the site as when First National announced its
disinvestment plans. The economy has to be traced over twenty years to find
more jobs on those 52 acres. Furthermore, the mall development does not
appear to have hurt local commerce significantly.
Retailing at Assembly Square, as well as the office building,
largely is "export." Staff at Bernett Research, an office park tenant and
holder of the exclusive right to conduct market surveys in the mall, say
that 20%-30% of shoppers in Assembly Square are Somerville residents.
Therefore, 70%-80% come from outside the city. The jobs and property taxes
generated by the development are supported by consumers and office firms
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from other municipalities as was the previous manufacturing at the Mystic
River.
Somerville's tax base has continued to steadily decline following
the development of Assembly Square. The problems afflicting the base, when
a city's economy was formally rooted in sunset manufactures, cannot be
arrested by a two-building commercial complex. At this writing, Assembly
Square is undertaxed, a situation which appears recognized city-wide. The
idea to mitigate the tax burden on the developer during start-up was
reasonable. However, after four years in operation, Assembly Square should
be revalued to a reasonable level. Hiring a consultant to reappraise the
development is a late first step toward that direction.
Marketing problems of the mall and office must be corrected so that
Assembly Square can sustain its employment record and higher tax payments.
Matthews and Patty Crooks, former vice-president of East Bay, both point to
the dual market of the mall as a problem. The anchors, K-Mart and Jordan
Marsh, attract moderate and upper income clientele respectively. Despite
East Bay's thematic approach to mall development, the odd mix of Assembly
Square stores does not effectively attract a specific consumer group.109
Donald O'Brian, Vice President of Market Research for Jordan Marsh,
expressed satisfaction with sales volume at the mall, and thought
Somerville--specifically Assembly Square--could absorb more retailing "if it
is done with a master plan and not ad-hoc."1 1 0 This view is comlimentary
1 0 9 Sachs and Soley, May 4, 1982; also Matthews, April 26, 1984.
1 1 0 Telephone interview with Donald O'Brian, April 21, 1984.
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to an observation by Matthews that the mall's commercial health would be
improved if K-Mart could be replaced by a second middle income oriented
anchor. il The switch would upgrade the quality of the general mall stores
by attracting more upscale tenants, filling vacancies, and replacing
storefronts as leases expired. The sales in the mall to an exported market
would be strengthened while moderate income Somervillians would continue to
be served by department stores and commercial districts in the city.
The location of the Sack Theaters also hurts retailing in the mall.
As mentioned previously, Sack adjoins the office building. The benefit of
this location is that the office park is used days, nights, and weekends.
However, it is inconvenient to walk between the office park and mall. If
the twelve theater complex located by the mall, many Sack customers
instinctively would wander through the retail shops before or after
attending movies.
The problems of the office building appear much more serious than
the mall. Assembly Square's locational advantages are proximity to Boston's
CBD, free parking, and relatively inexpensive rent. Current rents per
square foot are about $15-$16 gross, roughly $10 less than equivalent
buildings downtown. Of the five firms that relocated from Boston, three
cited the rent differential and two others said they needed available room
for expansion. Of the eight firms in the building, two referred to free
parking and four were attracted by the location.
illMatthews, April 26, 1984.
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Despite the available enticements, Assembly Square has not proved to
be a popular location for office development. The vacancy rate hovers
around 20%. Through a letter dated May 14, 1981, Manufacturers Hanover
Trust, the permanent lender backing the office building, informed tenants
that the Assembly Square Trustees had defaulted on terms of their mortgage
agreement, and in accordance with the agreement, rent was to be paid
directly to Manufacturers Hanover.
A number of explanations exist for the slack office market.
Matthews says that in retrospect the First National building should have
been torn down in favor of new construction. The rehabilitation saved fine
wood detail which cannot be reproduced today because of high cost, but it
resulted in poorly laid out office space.112 One tenant commented about
chronic ventilation problems and a lack of adequate security. Another
tenant praised the building, but said, "people prefer doing business in
Boston. Somerville is away from the center of action." Access by public
transportation is awkward. Local buses pass through Assembly Square.
However, the Orange Line goes by the site without stopping; connections to
the rapid transit system are available by two bus routes which run every 15
minutes to hourly depending on the time. Finally, there is the problem of
the image of Somerville. Robert Pihlcrantz, the former leasing agent,
112 Ibid.
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ventures: "Somerville is a high crime rate area with a rather low rank for
office users--certainly not a prestigious address." 1 1 3
113 Letter from Robert Pihlcrantz to Steven Landau, March 29, 1984.
CHAPTER VII
DEVELOPMENT IN SOMERVILLE
The short post-industrial history of Mystic River leaves a legacy of
unfulfilled master plans and a two-building commercial development. From
the Stackhouse proposal through the UDAG application, a mall and primary
office building were to be complimented by many other land uses. The city
used the Mystic River Area to present a picture of Somerville's future. The
conflicting ideas presented in each plan reflect a city shared by its
traditional working class residents and growing proportion of Cambridge
oriented professionals, students, and "bohemians." Proposals for
low-to-moderate income housing and light industrial development at Mystic
River reflected that the traditional-and-declining Somerville was valued.
Conflicting calls for luxury, riverfront housing, a marina, and a
hotel/convention complex indicate a desire to stimulate further middle class
in-migration. The existing complex lies between the two worlds.
Overwhelmingly, professional employment at Assembly Square never was
available to Somervillians. Yet, perhaps 75% of the total jobs at the site
are within reach of low and moderately skilled residents. In this respect,
the development'is more valuable to the old Somerville than to the new city.
Assembly Square is a product of private market choice and the
federal highway and UDAG programs; these outside forces defined what was
possible. City Hall could not develop its full vision of Somerville,
upscaling the city while protecting the interests of long-time residents.
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However, civic institutions are rooted in the traditional city. The Ralph,
August, and Brune administrations aimed to maintain opportunities in
Somerville for its traditional workforce, and did not exclusively embrace
commercial and upscale development.
Overall, Assembly Square has been beneficial to Somerville. The
mall and office park integrate the City of Somerville into the regional
economy. However, surrounded by state and interstate highways, and a row of
older industrial buildings, Assembly Square is an isolated "export" district
for the city. The physical barriers around the development prevent the
influx of shoppers from significantly stimulating commerce elsewhere in
Somerville, and insulates locally oriented retail trade from mall
competition.
The mixed basic economic results previously were noted. To date
property taxes received from Assembly Square are far too low, though
potential exists for a 100% to 200% increase in annual revenues. Employment
on the 52 acre site has doubled since First National moved to Connecticut.
Less than 50% of these jobs are suitable for primary wage earners in pay
and/or available work hours. Subtract the 260 professional office jobs
never available to Somervillians, and primary employment falls to a distinct
minority. The variety of jobs meet a spectrum of individual needs, and fill
a useful niche in the city.
Mystic River development has had a profound impact on Somerville
because it is the foundation of a learning curve at OPCD. The office has
overlapped during the Ralph-August-Brune administrations. J. Richard Poulin
was a Ralph holdover as Director of OPCD under August. Matthews worked on
the Assembly Square project for a year with Brune before leaving for
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Medford. The first commercial development plan was formulated in the Ralph
administration, the East Bay proposal, the second development plan, and the
UDAG application occurred during the August years. August's OPCD secured
the UDAG, but it was implemented under Brune. The Brune administration
prodded the Board of Aldermen to pass the Chapter 121B and CARD designation,
allowing the city to receive the grant; exercise eminent domain powers; and
build the roadway infrastructure. Brune presided over the construction of
the complex and its opening. This continuity made Assembly Square a
laboratory for working with developers, investors, and UDAGs.
At present OPCD is not actively pursuing development in the ASDA
(With the exception of the Pump House Restaurant).114 The office market is
poor. Retail is not yet ready to expand, and housing/hotel construction
seem very remote. Moreover the Massachusetts District Commission still owns
the waterfront. On its own, Assembly Square reflects the two Somervilles.
In addition to the 52 acre development site, a string of small smokestack
and warehousing firms sit between the commercial buildings and the river.
Two of the larger industrial firms recently expanded, and there appears to
be no likelihood that their land will be taken for further development of
the ASDA.
Today, city development efforts are concentrating internally on the
squares and at Brick Bottom. The squares are Somerville's traditional
commercial disticts, and are the focus of revitalization efforts. For
1 1 4 Interview with Thomas Pelham, April 14, 1984.
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example, substantial roadway improvements are being implemented in Union
Square.
In Davis Square, to take advantage of a new rapid transit Red Line
station, large scale commercial development relative to the city outside the
ASDA is being implemented. City programs encourage local storefront and
building rehabilitation. A 200 car garage was built, and OPCD is trying to
attract a developer to build a small to medium size (about 50,000 square
foot) office building.115 Davis Square development has presented a
difficult balancing problem to OPCD. The square is the center of a growing
pocket of upscale Somervillians. Current development efforts are viewed
warily, and acceptance is grudging, by established businesses and long-time
residents who fear that their neighborhood is being taken from them.
The Brune administration is facilitating light industry in Brick
Bottom through a UDAG for a 80,000 square foot plant for Telelogic,
manufacturers of automatic telephone dialing devices. The Telelogic
building is not part of a master plan for the area. It reflects a single
concrete development opportunity being exploited by the City.ll6 Expected
to generate 250 manufacturing jobs, Telelogic may be a harbinger for future
development in the city, including vacant parcels in Assembly Square. As
real estate in Cambridge appreciates, "high-tech" type industries may seek
less expensive land in Somerville for manufacturing plants (Telelogic is
headquartered ii Cambridge). The expansion out of Cambridge of high-tech
1 1 5Ibid.
1 1 6 Ibid.
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production is presenting a market opportunity for Somerville to revitalize
its manufacturing base.
Epilogue: Assembly Square and the Image of Somerville
A stated goal of the Assembly Square development plan and general
public policy under Brune has been to "open-up" Somerville. It was hoped
that Assembly Square would bring people into the city, and show Somerville
as a good investment opportunity. Assembly Square lured major investors.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust and Mutual Life of New York backed the office
Park and Mall respectively with equity participation loans. The slack
office market and retailing problems discussed above have not encouraged
further major commercial investments spinning off from the development.
Pelham points to the open development procedures which followed up
Assembly Square, including meaningful processes for community participation
in decision making and the use of development kits. The city's objective is
to give developers confidence that they will not be "ripped-off" if they
come to Somerville. 1 1 7
The scandal hovering over Assembly Square publicly pastes the
development with the odious "Slumerville" tag. Pelham fears that the city
will remain under a cloud until the Grand Jury acts. Of course, if the Jury
issues indictments a trial will keep "corruption in Somerville" headlines in
the media for a substantial length of time. Furthermore testimony likely
will be solicited from current as well as previous city officials. "People
1 1 7 Ibid.
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working with [OPCD]," says Pelham, "know that Brune is not the problem. But
people who do not know Brune think: 'ah, it's Somerville.'" 1 1 8
To date, the scandal is centering on the relationship between East
Bay and Lawrence Bretta, the former Somerville mayor; the granting liquor
licenses for Assembly Square; and city assessment practices. The
administration of UDAG has not been an issue. 1 1 9
The probe is hurting Somerville by reinforcing negative imagery that
the Assembly Square development slowly began to relegate to the past.
Pelham fears that quality developers who might have considered coming to
Somerville will stay away, leaving the city to less desirable investors. It
also is possible that desired developers who remain interested in Somerville
will be in a strong position to demand subsidies without giving significant
quid-pro-quos on factors as city hiring policies, UDAG equity participation
terms, and design agreements. However, some optimism can be generated.
Development opportunities in the city are not affected, tangibly by the
Grand Jury. Also, the possibility exists that the investigation and future
indictments will be the core of a reform movement within Somerville.
Broadly generated outcry for removing corrupt officials in the city and
appropriate action may provide public reassurance that public institutions
and processes in fact are open.
11
11 8 Ibid.
1 1 9East Bay went out of business in 1982 after its president,
Raymond Coots, died. Several executives formed JDC Properties in Reading.
They refuse any comment on the Assembly Square development (Somerville
Journal, February 18, 1984).
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APPENDIX
VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY AND THE TAX RATE
CITY OF SOMERVILLE, 1955-1984
Valuation Tax Rate
($ 1000s) per $1000
1955 $124,739 $ 63.20
1956 124,942 69.90
1957 125,139 71.20
1958 126,166 79.20
1959 125,036 83.40
1960 125,257 91.30
1961 126,164 93.00
1962 126,011 96.20
1963 125,496 95,70
1964 126,640 99.40
1965 127,727 107.20
1966 126,765 111.90
1967 125,404 126.80
1968 124,371 131.90
1969 123,969 143.80
1970 124,430 169.30
1971 124,244 177.30
1972 123,433 181.80
1973 122,809 171.60
1/1/74-6/30/74 123,124 85.80
Fiscal
Year 1975 123,124 196.20
FY 1976 121,212 199.70
FY 1977 121,790 237.60
FY 1978 120,805 268.10
FY 1979 119,068 266.60
.FY 1980 199,146 245.80
FY 1981 115,924 292.11
FY 1982 115,427 246.82
FY 1983 115,290 211.95
FY 1984 115,290 211.95
Sources: Annual Reports, City of Somerville, 1955-1077; Tax
Recapitulation of Somerville, 1978-1984.
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